Remote electronic voting has attracted increasing attention in cryptographic research. A promising protocol presented by Juels et al. is currently widely discussed. Although it offers a remarkably high degree of coercion-resistance under reasonable assumptions, it can not be employed in practice due to its poor efficiency. The improvements that have been proposed either require stronger trust assumptions or turned out to be insecure. In this paper, we present an enhancement of the protocol, which runs in linear time without changing the underlying trust assumptions.
Introduction
Many governments are aiming at introducing modern technology into their voting processes. Particularly, remote e-voting systems are meant to make voting easier, faster, and more attractive. As appealing as that may seem, introducing physical distance between the voter and the ballot-box comes with a price. Since voters can no longer witness their ballot reach its destination with their own eyes, they need to be provided with another means of assurance. At first sight, this seems to be a simple problem, easily solvable by publishing the set of collected ciphertext votes to let voters verify that their votes have been cast as intended. However, care needs to be taken. Generally, such an approach will allow voters to prove violent coercers or generous vote buyers how they voted. Since voter coercion and vote buying (short: coercion) are highly scalable in an electronic network environment, they need to be prevented. Unfortunately, it seems very difficult to prove voters that their vote is cast as intended (individual verifiability), without allowing them to prove others how they voted (receipt-freeness).
The protocol underlying this paper was published in 2005 by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [8], often referred to as the JCJ protocol. Even today, it seems to be the only known protocol for remote e-voting that offers individual verifiability and receipt-freeness simultaneously under somewhat acceptable trust assumptions. Apart from disabling voters from proving how they voted, the protocol even ensures immunity against coercers who try to force voters into handing out their credentials (simulation attack) or not casting their votes at all (forced abstention attack). Protocols that avoid all conceivable attacks of coercion are attributed coercion-resistant. The JCJ protocol offers a remarkably high degree of coercion-resistance.
Since JCJ imposes unrealistic computational requirements on the tallying authorities, it can not be employed in a real-world context. Nevertheless, the protocol is widely discussed and taken as a starting point for further improvements [2-4, 11, 12] . The ultimate goal of these proposals is to reduce the quadratic running time of the JCJ tallying procedure. We propose our modification of the JCJ protocol to allow tallying in linear time. Section 2, describes JCJ in more detail and points out its security properties and trust assumptions. Section 3 presents our modification of the protocol and shows why the security properties of JCJ are preserved without having to strengthen any trust assumptions. Section 4 concludes the paper and exposes some open questions.
The JCJ Protocol
To achieve receipt-freeness, other protocols need to assume an untappable channel [10] between authorities and voters at every voting event. Requiring voters to visit the authorities' offices at each occasion clearly compromises the spirit of remote e-voting. JCJ is distinguished by assuming an untappable channel only during the distribution of the voters' credentials. Since JCJ allows credentials to be re-used in many subsequent voting events, they can be distributed easily when citizens appear in person at the administration offices to register as new community members.
Description of the Protocol
In the following paragraphs, we present each phase of the JCJ protocol. Due to space constraints, we settle for a semi-formal style of exposition. In particular, we do not thoroughly explain well-known cryptographic techniques. Furthermore, we assume the application of publicly verifiable group threshold mechanisms whenever registering or tallying authorities perform joint computations, even if the text might suggest a single entity. All ciphertexts are ElGamal encryptions over a pre-established multiplicative cyclic group (G q , ·, 1) of order q, for which the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) is assumed to be hard.
Registration.
The registrars jointly establish the random credential σ ∈ G q and pass it to voter V through an untappable channel. Additionally, they append a randomized encryption S = Enc ε (σ, α S ) of σ to V 's entry in the voter roll, which is modeled as a public bulletin board. Value α S denotes the encryption's randomness, and ε stands for the tallying authorities' common public key. Assuming a majority of trustworthy registrars, in the end only V will know σ and no one will know α S .
